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To say (p. 218) that Lilly's *Latin Grammar* was first printed in London in 1755 is to overlook almost a quarter-millennium of Latin in the schools of old England. It is doubtless Ward's edition of that famous book that is referred to.

Inaccuracies abound in the accounts of the several colleges and universities, as when the General Court of Massachusetts is made to vote money for a college in 1630, Cotton Mather is made president of Harvard College, and that institution is declared to have been "nominally under state control" until 1865. Unwarranted liberties are taken with the text of historic documents, as in the surprising version (p. 25) of a vote of the town-meeting of Boston. There are numerous slips and incongruities in some of the lists of references, as, notably, in those following chapters iv and xv. The list of particular instances might be greatly extended.

One would gladly find something more favorable to say of a work on which so much of serious labor has been expended. Probably the best portions of the book are those, mainly in the latter half, in which the author sets forth and analyzes the information available with reference to the recent history and present state of our educational system in some of its special aspects—commercial education, learned societies, the education of the Indian, etc. But even in such portions we could sometimes wish for more convincing evidence that the items presented have been adequately sifted or that they have been interpreted with genuine insight.

ELMER ELLSWORTH BROWN.

Napoleonic Studies. By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D. (London: George Bell and Sons. 1904. Pp. xii, 398.)

THIS volume is a most important supplement to the author's *Life of Napoleon*. The twelve papers and ten appendixes which it contains have all or nearly all been published from time to time in one or another review. It was worth while to collect them. While they vary in their temper and treatment as widely as the subjects, yet the author's personality gives them quite sufficient unity to secure the interest of the reader and the continuity of the subject. In our opinion those on "The Idealist Revolt against Napoleon", on "Napoleon's Religious Belief", and on "The Whigs and the French War" are of literary interest but not in the author's best vein, which is rather the reasoned treatment of the state papers he has so industriously collected. Each of the three essays entitled respectively "Pitt's Plans for the Settlement of Europe", "Napoleon and British Commerce", and "Austria and the Downfall of Napoleon" is admirable in its way, the last being the most novel and interesting of the three. Numbers iv, "Egypt during the First British Occupation", v, "Canning and Denmark in 1807", vi, "A British Agent at Tilsit", viii, "Britain's Food Supply in the Napoleonic War", xi, "The Prussian Co-operation at Waterloo", and xii, "The

Detention of Napoleon by Great Britain", all belong to the field of British apologetics in history. They are convincing discussions of questions which affect the course of history to be sure, but which after all have not determined the channel of its great central stream.

Incidentally they clear up several little mysteries of antiquarian interest. The reader will be amazed at the slight knowledge of Egypt which the western world possessed a hundred years ago! It appears that Canning's information about the treaty of Tilsit, though strangely roundabout, was secured through Russian channels and was strictly correct. It is interesting, most interesting, to read Mr. Rose's partial apology for Denmark. With masterly hand he destroys the legend that Britain's food supply throughout the Napoleonic wars was secured in spite of hostile efforts and by means of overwhelming naval superiority. In the matter of the never-ending Waterloo controversy, strict justice is measured to Prussia's participation, to both her mediate and her immediate influence on the culmination of the struggle. It is a novel point of view which is indicated, or at least hinted, that Wellington's force was really only the auxiliary in a campaign dependent for success upon the main army of Blücher. Two illusions, says Dr. Rose, have been dispelled: the British legend that the Prussians came in at the finish to reap Wellington's harvest; the French legend that seventy thousand Frenchmen held at bay as many foes under Wellington and as many more plus ten thousand under Blücher until treason turned the day. He feels that still a third should be relegated to oblivion: that Blücher's army, in the lately spoken words of Emperor William II, "rescued the English army from destruction at Waterloo".

Chapter XII, entitled "The Detention of Napoleon by Great Britain", gives a curious insight into the official mind of London for the years 1815-1821. The author's examination of the British archives has brought to light papers which seem to confirm others from French sources long since published in regard to plans for Napoleon's escape from St. Helena. There has never been any reasonable doubt that exile prolonged the emperor's life, because Prussia certainly, and probably Austria, would have executed him as a criminal had he fallen into their hands. That any careful or even respectable plans were ever made to rescue him from captivity remains thus far among the things not proved. Our author's contribution to the question creates some probability of their existence and exhibits clearly how uneasy and credulous the British officials were. This is the sufficient justification of many rigors which they practised. Lord Rosebery's volume on the St. Helena phase was a political pamphlet in the main and was so understood by most of his readers; in no sense a serious historical contribution, it somewhat disturbed many English minds, and possibly it was worth while to refute his positions, as is done thoroughly in this chapter. Napoleon did escape from Elba, and cost Europe millions of treasure as well as countless lives. It was not intended that he should escape from St. Helena, and he did not. He was shabbily treated as an emperor, perhaps; but the gov-

ernment house was not available for his lodging, because, as we here read, it was the center of all the signal system from every point of the island, and after that he had the best there was. A new and more commodious house than Longwood was prepared and erected, but he desired the rôle of martyr and would never, except under compulsion, have occupied a first-rate dwelling. As General Bonaparte, a state prisoner, the captive was treated with considerable generosity. Of this the household accounts afford quite sufficient evidence.

The most important of all these papers is the second. Hitherto our knowledge of both French and British policy between the years 1795 and 1805 has been based almost exclusively on continental sources. An enlightened and singularly scientific policy has ordered the French archives so thoroughly and opened them to the public so generously that almost of necessity historians have been influenced by this fact. Both the British and the Austrian governments have so arranged the management of their historical fountains that only persistent residents of the respective lands could secure access to the penetralia. Dr. Rose himself has had almost a monopoly of the Public Record Office during the Napoleonic era, though others would fain have enjoyed the same privilege. Accordingly he is able to trace step by step in an interesting and convincing way the evolution of British policy as Pitt framed it. He shows how in 1795 the hopes of Britain were founded in Austria, how Bonaparte's Italian campaigns shattered those plans and in 1798 threw England and Russia temporarily together for the pacification of Europe. It was then for the first time that Pitt, knowing how eager the Hapsburgs were to let Belgium go in return for some gain nearer home, first suggested the idea of a Dutch-Flemish state as a barrier to French ambitions for the "natural" boundaries. More important still is the exhibition of such inherent weakness in the Second Coalition as to disprove conclusively that France owed her territorial integrity and her very existence to the frenzied exertions of the Convention. It is also shown that the initiative for the Third Coalition came from Russia. Further, we get a clear view of Pitt's mind. Utterly destitute of any liberal sentiment about the right of peoples to self-determination—the very word was unknown in 1805 to European statesmen—he firmly believed in the nationality of states which had exhibited nationality. In support of the balance of power he was willing to spend five million pounds in European subsidies; this and similar details were carried out in 1814 when Canning negotiated "his" treaty of Chaumont. Pitt desired the independence of Switzerland and Holland, the autonomy of both Italy and Germany. Our author admits that Pitt's policy looked to existing needs only, and that it was premature; he makes clear, however, that after the furnace heats and cyclopean weldings of the Napoleonic wars it reasserted itself and has proved more practical than the schemes of the French emperor.

We cannot reprint even the substance where there is so much that is vital to a reconstructed and scientific view of modern history, and we

have given only a sample. Likewise in regard to the other most important chapter, that numbered x and relating to Austria's participation in Napoleon's downfall, we can give only an instance or two. Here Dr. Rose works at second-hand, relying on the biographies of Austrian diplomatists in part, and in part on the state papers printed by Austrian historians from their own archives, apparently as accessible to natives and not more open to strangers than those of London. Two facts are emphasized: that twenty years of military failure had left Austria impoverished; that in 1813 she had really far more to fear from the czar than from the emperor Napoleon. It seems proved that Metternich really desired peace, and that his offer of friendly intervention in April was sincere. Napoleon rejected it for both military and dynastic reasons. Then for the first time, about July, Austria for self-preservation framed her policy of armed mediation. The declaration by the emperor Francis of war on his son-in-law, the methods by which he used his own child to secure state secrets, the subsequent behavior of Maria Louisa, these in connection with numerous unedifying details have combined to place Francis in a very dark light at the bar of history. If the Austrian emperor actually sacrificed natural affection and inclination to the interests of his people as is indicated above, the judgment of posterity will eventually be modified if not reversed. Finally we call attention to the confirmations that Dr. Rose's gleanings afford of the fact that the armistice which Napoleon granted at Poischwitz while the allies consulted was the verge of his undoing. Had he driven his foe onward to Glatz, as was well within his power, and so have forced a conclusive struggle there, the event would have favored him almost beyond a peradventure. To reject the moderate terms formulated by the Congress of Prague was possibly a grave fault; probably, however, it would have been a more serious one to accept a sovereignty limited by European consent. Had he made the first step backward in 1813 after the awful diminution of prestige due to 1812, there might have been delay in the Napoleonic decline, but the chances are that nothing short of an impregnable military power could ever have supported his authority. The decline of that military power dates from the fateful armistice. A movement carefully studied and based on sound considerations, both diplomatic and military, proved futile only and solely through an error of military judgment. This error was due to his fatal conviction that Austria, facing an ultimatum, would again yield to his iron will as she had so often done before.

The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and the Rise of the Secret Societies. By R. M. JOHNSTON. (New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan and Company. 1904. Two vols., pp. xxi, 408; ix, 232.)

To recount the events and conditions of the Two Sicilies is the most disheartening labor which to-day confronts the serious student of nine-